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Abstract
Audits are a standard mechanism for reducing corruption in government investments. The
quality of audits themselves, however, may be affected by relationships between auditor and
target. We study whether provincial chief auditors in China show greater leniency in evaluating
prefecture governments in their hometowns. In city-fixed-effect specifications – in which the
role of shared background is identified from auditor turnover – we show that hometown auditors
find 46 percent less in questionable monies per investigation. This hometown effect is similar
throughout the auditor’s tenure, and is diminished for audits ordered by the provincial Organi-
zations Department as a result of the departure of top city officials. Collectively, we argue that
our findings are most readily explained by favoritism rather than an endogenous response by
local officials to concerns of better enforcement by hometown auditors. We complement these
city-level findings with firm-level analyses of earnings manipulation by state-owned enterprises
via real activity manipulation (a standard measure from the accounting literature), which we
show is higher under hometown auditors.
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1 Introduction
Public investment provides essential (and potentially very productive) public goods, such as trans-
port infrastructure and schools. At the same time, public investment may be particularly prone
to corruption (e.g., Tanzi and Davoodi (1998)). One common prescription to limit theft and/or
mismanagement of public projects is the threat of ex post evaluation and audit, which in turn raises
the concern that preexisting relationships between the auditor and those under investigation may
allow corrupt or inept officials to avoid detection and/or punishment. Thus, there is an emphasis
on the role of independent auditors to ensure effective enforcement (Dabla-Norris et al. (2012)).
While conflict-of-interest rules restrict the most obvious relationships between monitor and
target, such as family ties and/or business relationships, less visible and/or more diffuse ties may
nonetheless facilitate auditor-target collusion, or otherwise compromise the objectivity of oversight.
In this paper, we examine how such ties affect the findings of provincial audits of municipal fund
expenditures in China. We focus on the provincial chief auditor’s city of birth as a source of
potential connection to audit targets. Hometown connections are a natural focus in our setting, as
such ties are a well-documented nexus of favor exchange in China (Fisman et al. (2018)), Vietnam
(Do et al. (2017)) and countries with weak institutions more generally (Hodler and Raschky (2014))
which, we argue, may lead to greater leniency in evaluations of “hometown” expenditures.
We explore this “hometown favoritism” hypothesis by looking at the outcomes of audits in
278 Chinese prefectures during the years 2006-2015. According to the Audit Law of the People’s
Republic of China, evaluations are carried out – either directly or indirectly – by province-level audit
departments.1 The chief officers of province-level audit departments, like many top officials in China,
experience frequent rotation, providing plausible variation for identifying whether lead auditors
show greater leniency for audits of their hometown governments. In our preferred specification
– which includes city fixed effects so that the hometown auditor effect is identified from auditor
turnover – we find that audits turn up 46 percent fewer suspicious expenditures per audit when
the lead auditor is investigating his hometown (we do not find that a hometown auditor conducts
fewer audits).2
A natural alternative interpretation for this finding is that expectation of more effective en-
forcement by hometown auditors leads to less questionable behavior. This explanation is premised
1In the case of indirect audits, the prefecture-level audit departments carry out the audits, supervisied by the
province-level audit department. Major expenditures must be audited directly by the province-level audit department,
according to the Audit Law. Even in cases in which the audit is carried out by the prefecture audit department, the
city’s chief auditor reports directly to the province’s chief auditor.
2We cannot distinguish between auditor-target corruption versus an auditor’s preference for leniency toward
hometown officials. In either case, investigations turn up little suspicious activity. This distinction is analogous to
the “active” versus “passive” waste in the corruption literature, which is rarely able to differentiate between the two
without direct observation of bribery. See Bandiera et al. (2009) for an exception.
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on the assumption that hometown officials have local knowledge or networks that allow them to
better detect suspicious activity and/or sanction it. Local government and SOE officials, antic-
ipating stronger enforcement, thus take care to avoid potential violations. We present a pair of
heterogeneity analyses, which collectively suggest that this “deterrence” explanation is unlikely to
account for our main finding. First, we look at the hometown auditor effect as a function of his
tenure. Chief auditor assignments are made in each province by its Organization Department of the
Party Standing Committee (the province’s highest authority). As we explain in the next section,
these appointments are governed by a range of considerations, and would be exceedingly difficult for
prefecture-level bureaucrats (or indeed the chief auditors themselves) to predict. This uncertainty
in the assignment process implies that, in the earlier years of his tenure, a chief auditor oversees
evaluations of projects that were planned and implemented before local officials could anticipate the
arrival of a hometown auditor. Thus, if anticipation of strict enforcement were responsible for the
hometown effect, we would expect the hometown favoritism effect to be muted early in an auditor’s
tenure. We do not, however, find any evidence of a differential effect in the auditor’s first year, or
as a function of the auditor’s tenure more generally.
We next examine whether the hometown auditor effect differs in years in which one of the city’s
top two officials (the party secretary and the mayor) leaves office. Central government regulation
dictates that, following such departures, audits be directly carried out by the provincial Audit De-
partment and overseen by the provincial Organization Department, the most powerful department
in the province (whose leader always serves on the the provincial Standing Committee), and also
the provincial Discipline Inspection Commission, the provincial division of the CPC Central Com-
mission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). We argue that Organization Department and Discipline
Inspection Commission oversight will constrain the chief auditor, and as a result any hometown
favoritism will be attenuated in years of top officials’ departures. Consistent with the disciplining
role of this higher-level oversight, the hometown auditor effect drops by nearly half in party secre-
tary and mayor turnover years (that is, we observe less hometown favoritism when one of the city’s
top two officials leaves office).
Finally, we complement our city-year analyses with firm-level analyses on earnings manipulation
at state-owned enterprises. Since state-owned enterprises also fall under the purview of provincial
auditors, we examine whether questionable accounting practices are more common in the presence
of a hometown auditor. We focus on earnings management through real activities manipulation
(RAM). In the paper that develops this measure, Roychowdhury (2006) suggests that it captures
firms’ use of price discounts to temporarily boost sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods
sold, and reduced discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins (Roychowdhury (2006)
further shows that firms deploy such techniques to meet analyst earnings expectations).
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The SOE analyses complements our main results on government audits in several ways. First,
our RAM analyses further serve to assess whether the hometown audit effect is the result of fa-
voritism or anticipated enforcement. In contrast to audit outcomes, in which favoritism and deter-
rence yield the same prediction, for real activities manipulation the two theories generate opposing
predictions: In the presence of a lenient auditor, a firm will engage in more questionable accounting
practices, whereas anticipation of greater scrutiny will lead firms to avoid accounting red flags.
Second, our SOE sample allows for a more disaggregated analysis, so we may better account for
attributes of potential audit targets. Third, it allows us to examine whether the hometown audit
effect manifests itself in public expenditure audits as well as evaluations of quasi-public state en-
terprises (which, in our sample, are partially privatized). Our analyses of earnings manipulation in
state-owned firms reinforces the view that auditors show greater leniency toward hometown officials:
RAM is on average about a fifth of a (within-firm) standard deviation higher in the presence of a
hometown auditor. This result survives the inclusion of city- as well as firm fixed-effects.
Our work contributes to several related literatures that collectively aim to understand the im-
pediments to effective oversight of both public projects and private firms. In particular, a sizeable
literature in accounting and finance focuses on the monitoring role of external auditors, and em-
phasizes the potential conflicts that result from ties between a firm’s leadership and and ostensibly
independent auditors. He et al. (2017), for example, show for a sample of Chinese firms that audit
quality is poorer when external auditors share school ties with audit committee members, and a
large number of earlier papers show that social ties between executives and external auditors sim-
ilarly impair the quality of external auditors’ work (see, e.g., Guan et al. (2016) for China, and
Baber et al. (2014) for the U.S.).
These papers focus exclusively on oversight of private firms by outside monitors that are effec-
tively hired on behalf of shareholders to monitor its agents (i.e., the executive), and highlight the
potential conflicts that arise when executives and the board play a role in monitor selection. A
closely related set of concerns arise with the hiring of so-called third party auditors, to monitor
firms’ compliance with national laws and regulations. As observed by Duflo et al. (2013), third-
party auditors are also often hired by the firm, which creates a similar set of conflicts of interests
as for external auditors.
To our knowledge, we are the first to study potential conflicts in monitoring by government
auditors. Our setting is quite distinct from the oversight of private firms – whether by external
auditors to monitor shareholders’ interests or third-party auditors to monitor regulatory compliance
– examined in earlier work. We look at monitors selected by independent bureaucrats who should
be less subject to the conflicts of interest that afflict a firm’s executive or board. Furthermore,
our focus on oversight of public rather than private activities has distinct political economy and/or
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welfare implications.
Given our focus on hometown connections, we also contribute to the literature on the role of
social ties in the functioning of bureaucracies in general and in China in particular. This literature
has generally emphasized favoritism as the dominant force (e.g., Fisman et al. (2018) and others),
though Fisman et al. (2019) and Fisman et al. (2017) emphasize that other considerations – whether
better information, enforcement or other concerns – may also play an important role in some
settings.
Finally, our finding that social ties are associated with greater leniency in oversight has direct
policy implications for the design of conflict-of-interest rules. In general, there is a tradeoff in
restricting well-connected candidates from monitoring positions: a locally-connected monitor may
have better information or ability to enforce compliance than an outsider, an advantage that needs
to be weighed against the costs of potential favoritism. Our results suggest that favoritism may
be a dominant factor in our setting, which provides a rationale for the existence of rules against
assignment to one’s home region precisely to reduce the potential for collusion and/or self-dealing
(see Fisman et al. (2017)). Furthermore, our results suggest potential future directions for the
growing body of work that uses the results of external audits to study accountability and corruption
(e.g., Ferraz and Finan (2008),Ferraz and Finan (2011) Gerardino et al. (2017), and Avis et al.
(2018)). These studies take audit reports themselves as uncorrupted, whereas we highlight the fact
that audits themselves might be subject to bias.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Monitoring and evaluation of Chinese municipal governments
The system of oversight for Chinese governments’ revenues and expenditures was delineated in the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 1982. The Constitution stipulated the
creation of a central government body, estabilshed by the State Council, to “supervise through
auditing the revenue and expenditure of all departments under the State Council and of the lo-
cal governments at various levels, and the revenue and expenditure of all financial and monetary
organizations, enterprises and institutions of the state” (Article 91 of the Constitution). The Consti-
tution further required that local governments also establish auditing organs. These were required
for governments at the county-level (one level below prefecture/city) and higher. Article 109 of the
Constitution specified that, “the local auditing organs...should report to the corresponding local
government and also auditing organs at the higher level.” That is, the audit department at the
county level was mandated to report to the prefecture-level audit department (in addition to report-
5
ing to the county government), the prefecture audit department to the provincial audit department
(and also the prefecture government), and so forth. Thus, from the initial establishment of China’s
governmental audit system, the provincial audit chief’s direct authority over the prefectural audit
chief has been codified in law.
The laws contained in the 1982 Constitution also led to the formal establishment of the Na-
tional Audit Office of the People’s Republic of China in September, 1983, which is a cabinet-level
ministry, one of twenty-six such departments that comprise the State Council, China’s chief admin-
istrative body. Among other responsibilities, the National Audit Office supervises provincial audit
offices throughout the country. By the end of 1983, all provinces had established their own Audit
Departments, with the exception of Fujian and Guangxi, which established theirs in 1984.
The laws formalizing the roles and responsibilities of audit offices at various levels were not put
in place until the passage of the 1994 Audit Law, which went into effect on January 1, 1995. The
audit law was substantially revised in February 2006, so as to give expanded responsibilities to
each audit office. In particular, the law specified that the local office was required to audit all local
government branches and local SOEs, and also that the local chief audit officer would be selected
by the local Party Standing Committee. More importantly (and of particular relevance for our
setting), Article 16 of the law specified that a local audit office has the authority to directly audit
lower-level government sectors and SOEs (that is, the provincial audit office has the authority to
audit any prefectural government department and any SOE controlled by the prefecture.)
In general, provincial auditors tend to focus primarily on more significant audits. While there is
no formal delineation of investigations of municipal expenditures conducted at the prefecture- versus
provincial-level, a review of the practices of several provinces (Hunan, Jiangsu, Sichuan) suggests a
few commonalities. Provincial auditors generally audit the implementation of the fiscal budgeting
(revenues and expenditures) of prefecture government departments. Furthermore, when an entire
sector (e.g., the finance industry or public utilities) faces an audit across the entire province, it is
managed by the provincial audit department, as it requires coordination across multiple prefectures.
Larger individual investments in fixed assets, such as roads or buildings, may fall under the purview
of provincial auditors. SOEs owned by the provincial government are also overseen by the provincial
auditor, rather than the prefectural auditor in the city where the SOE is located. Furthermore, the
provincial Party Standing Committee can order “special audits” at its discretion, which provides
wide latitude for the provincial audit office in its oversight of prefectures.
Finally, the departure of top prefecture officials, by law, automatically triggers an audit by the
provincial audit office.3 More specifically, the government responsibilities or sectors under direct
3This requirement was put in place for county-level leaders in the Interim Provisions on the Audit of Economic
Responsibilities of Party and Government Leading Cadres at the County Level in May 1999. An expansion of these
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supervision of the departing officer are targeted for provincial audit. For the mayor, the prefecture
government’s office would be audited, as well as any other sectors or departments assigned to him
for supervision. For example, if the mayor were mainly in charge of the Education and Finance
Departments (not an unusual situation in Chinese cities), while the vice-mayor supervised the Price
and Policy Departments, then Finance and Education would be audited when the mayor departs,
but not Price and Finance. This audit cannot be undertaken by the prefecture office, since top
prefecture officials outrank the prefecture’s chief auditor. Crucially, audits conducted immediately
following the departure of one or both of the prefecture’s chief officers also take place under the
leadership and guidance of the province’s Organization Department, the highest administrative
body in the province. Thus, the provincial chief auditor has less discretion in his oversight of a
prefecture in the years of a city chief officer’s departure.
2.2 Selection of the provincial audit chief
In each provincial audit department, the chief auditor is assisted by, on average, six vice-chief audit
officers. It is possible for any government officials with the same rank as, or one level below, the
provincial audit chief to be selected as a chief auditor. We obtained the name of each provincial chief
auditor from the audit yearbooks, and hand-collected information on the last job title/position for
each individual. Many chief auditors held lower-level positions as auditors or finance/tax officials
within the same province: 30 percent of provincial chief auditors were provincial vice-chief auditors
immediately before their appointments (which is defined as PastAuditor); 15 percent came from the
provincial Finance Department or Tax Bureau, either as vice-chief officer (thus the appointment
was a promotion) or chief officer (so that the appointment to chief auditor was a lateral move),
which is defined as PastFinance. However, many also come from less closely aligned branches of
the bureaucracy: 18 percent served as the vice-chief or chief officer4 of a prefecture within the
province, which is defined as PastCityLeader ; 5 percent came from the provincial Commission for
Discipline Inspection or provincial Supervision Department, as vice-chief officer (PastDiscipline).5
The remaining 32 percent came from different departments within the provincial government (e.g.,
the Education Department, Price Department) or the central government.
The chief auditor is appointed by the provincial Standing Committee (subject to the rubber
stamp approval of the provincial People’s Congress). The timing of the appointment is itself un-
provisions were implemented in January 1, 2005, that extended the audit requirements to officials with ranks up to
that of mayor (Ting Ju Ji in Chinese Pinyin). See the Opinion on Expanding the Scope of the Economic Responsibility
Audit of Party and Government Leading Cadres to the Level of the Ting Ju Ji, released Nov 24, 2004.
4That is, vice-mayor, mayor, party secretary, or vice-party-secretary.
5For all but the largest prefectures, the provincial chief auditor has the same rank as the prefecture mayor or
party secretary, so that the appointment of a prefectural chief officer as provincial chief auditor would be seen as a
lateral move, whereas for vice-chief officers it would be a promotion.
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certain, as it depends on the career opportunities of the incumbent chief auditor, who may be
promoted by the provincial Standing Committee to higher office. Furthermore, as the distribution
of successors makes clear, there is a wide range of candidates for the position – even for the 30
percent that are provincial vice-chief auditors, the provincial Standing Committee has 6 candidates
to choose among. Overall, both the timing of turnover and the identity of the successor for the
chief auditor position would be difficult for prefectural officials to anticipate, a point we return to
below.
2.3 Data
The main outcome variables throughout come from public records of prefecture-level audits, recorded
in China Audit Yearbooks. Since 2003, these annual publications have included the number of audit
assignments undertaken and the amount of questionable monies uncovered, aggregated to the city-
level. We utilize the years 2006 to 2015 as the investigations covered by the yearbooks expanded
substantially in 2006.6
Our hand-collected audit data are complemented by hand-collected information on the back-
ground of each provincial chief audit officer, using a range of sources, including the China Audit
Yearbooks, official websites of each provincial Audit Office, and as needed the website Baidu (China’s
Google). Using these sources, we were able to identify the birth city of the full set of 61 provin-
cial chief auditors in our data. We use these background characteristics to generate the following
officer-level controls: years as chief auditor (Tenure), age, gender, dummy variables to denote the
department of the official’s previous position (PastAuditor, PastFinance, PastCityLeader, PastDis-
cipline), and education category variables to capture highest degree (Education: 4 for doctorate, 3
for master’s, 2 for undergraduate degree, 1 for some college or less)) and whether he has a finance
background (EduFinance).
To identify dates of turnover of top city officials (which, recall, triggers an audit overseen by the
Organization Department), we use the Chinese Local Leader Database, accessed via CSMAR, the
most widely used data vendor in China.
We also include (time-varying) city-level variables, which all come from the Chinese City Statis-
tical Yearbooks. City-level covariates include basic political and economic variables, in particular:
the logarithm of GDP per capita, the ratio of industrial output to GDP, the logarithm of total gov-
ernment revenues, the fiscal balance (government expenditures divided by income), foreign direct
investment as a fraction of GDP, and average years of education.7
6In the earlier years that prefecture-level audits were reported, the scale and outcome variables differed across
years – it was only in 2006 that the National Audit Office put in place consistent reporting criteria.
7Years of education is a provincial-level variable, as city-level figures are not available.
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Finally, for our analysis of SOE earnings management, we use firm-year level data, also taken
from CSMAR. Our main outcome variable is real activity manipulation (RAM), using the standard
definition from Roychowdhury (2006). Intuitively, the RAM measure aims to capture the extent to
which a firm’s activities are adjusted in order to improve reported margins. It includes manipulation
along three dimensions: cash flow from operations (cash discounts to boost short-term sales),
production costs (overproduction to reduce per-unit costs), and discretionary expenditures (e.g.,
cutbacks to R&D). In practice, each component of RAM is calculated by generating deviations from
predicted values. For example, “abnormal” cash flow from operations (CFO) is generated as the
residuals from a regression in which cash flow is a function of the level and growth in sales:
CFOit
Assetsit−1










Following Cohen et al. (2008), we sum the (normalized) values of the three measures of activities
manipulation, to generate our overall RAM measure. As an alternative measure of questionable
accounting practices, we use accrual manipulation (AM), as pioneered by Dechow et al. (1995),
calculated as the difference between total accruals (revenues and expenses booked but not realized
in a given year) and non-discretionary accruals, which are in turn estimated from a model based
on the gap between revenue and receivables growth.
In our SOE analyses we include the same set of chief auditor controls as for our city-level
analyses, as well as the following firm-level covariates: the logarithm of total assets, leverage (total
liabilities divided by total assets), ROA (return on assets), MB Ratio (the ratio of market cap to
book value of total equities), log(BoardSize), ownership share of the largest shareholder, whether
the chairperson is also the CEO, the ratio of independent directors to total number of directors,
ownership share of top (vice-CEO and above) managers, a dummy indicating whether the aduitor
is one of the Big 4 Audit firms (PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and KPMG) , the ratio of operating
cash flow to total assets , and the R&D ratio (R&D expenditures divided by sales).
2.4 Data overview
We begin by presenting an overview of the patterns in the data, which will help to motivate some
features of our empirical specifications in the next section.
In Figure 1, we show a series of figures depicting some of the time series patterns in the data.
We begin in Figure 1a by showing the average of the logarithm of suspicious expenditures per
audit across the years in our sample. There is a distinct increase in 2013, a natural result of the
well-publicized anti-corruption crackdown initiated by China’s central government in November
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2012. In Figure 1b, we show that there is an associated shift in auditor background – there is a
drop in appointments of former city leaders as chief auditors, and a corresponding increase in chief
auditors who are hired directly from the ranks of provincial or prefecture auditors. This is also a
natural consequence of the anticorruption crackdown, with a shift away from political/patronage
appointments toward those based more on expertise (although this shift comes with the perhaps
unintended consequences we documented in this paper: professional auditors’ conflicts-of-interest
or hometown favoritism, which may have undermined anticorruption efforts).
Our main takeaway from these initial graphs is that it will be essential to control throughout for
the anti-corruption period, both directly via year fixed effects, and also potentially via interactions
with our main control variables.
In Figure 1c, we show the log of suspicious expenditures uncovered per audit over time, splitting
the sample based on whether the chief auditor was born in the prefecture. Across the full sample,
suspicious expenditures uncovered are lower in cities when overseen by hometown provincial chief
auditors. In the next section, we will explore how this pattern is affected when we also include city
fixed effects, as well as chief auditor and city-year controls. In Figure 2, we show a histogram which
depicts just the pre- versus post-2013 average levels of suspicious expenditures for hometown versus
non-hometown auditors. The figure emphasizes that, while the level of questionable expenditures
uncovered is much higher in the later period, in both cases suspicious expenditures are higher for
non-hometown audits.
Before proceeding to our regression analyses, we provide summary statistics on the main vari-
ables we use, both for the city-year and firm-year analyses, in Tables 1a and 1b respectively. In Table
2, we compare the city-year attributes of observations with Hometown = 0 versus Hometown = 1.
While we emphasize that we will be identifying the role of hometown ties in city fixed effect speci-
fications, which exploit auditor turnover to identify the hometown effect, we also note that the two
groups of cities are statistically indistinguishable from one another in their basic attributes such as
income and government expenditure. (Since we perform this comparison at the city-year level, we
are inflating the effective sample size, underscoring the lack of any difference between prefectures
as a function of Hometown.)
3 Results
The main specification for our analyses of audit outcomes is as follows:
log(SuspiciousExpenditurescy) = βHometowna(c)y + βaXa(c)y + βcXcy + γc + υy + εcy (1)
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β is the coefficient of interest, relating the hometown status of the chief auditor a(c) in city c to the
suspicious expenditures turned up by his audit. The vectors Xa(c)y and Xcy reflect (time-varying)
auditor and city attributes, while γc and υy are fixed effects for each of the 278 cities and 10 years
in our data. We cluster standard errors at the city-level throughout.
In columns (1) – (4) of Table 3, we present specifications that include progressively more con-
trols, adding in city fixed effects (column (2)), auditor controls (column (3)), and city-year controls
(column (4)). Across all specifications the coefficient on Hometown is significant at least at the
5 percent level. In our favored specification, which includes controls for auditor and city charac-
teristics, β̂ = 0.49, indicating that suspicious expenditures uncovered by a hometown auditor were
nearly 50 percent lower than those found by non-hometown auditors. In column (5) we limit our
sample exclusively to prefectures for which there is within-city variation in Hometown and obtain
a similar (though marginally smaller) coefficient on Hometown.
Given the extremely large increase in suspicious expenditures found under the anti-corruption
crackdown, we allow for all control variables to have a different effect post-2013; that is, we add
Post2013∗Xa(c)y and Post2013∗Xcy as controls, where Post2013 is an indicator variable denoting
that Y ear ≥ 2013. We additionally allow the relationship between Hometown and suspicious ex-
penditures to differ under the anti-corruption crackdown by adding the term Hometown∗Post2013.
These results appear in column (6). The direct effect of Hometown is less negative than in the
preceding column, and the coefficient on Hometown ∗ Post2013 is positive, though small in mag-
nitude. Overall, we cannot reject the existence of a comparable effect of Hometown before versus
during the anticorruption campaign.8
In the final two columns of Table 3, we examine whether the link between hometown auditor and
suspicious expenditures is driven by the number of audits undertaken, versus the value of suspicious
expenditures per audit. In theory both are possible, given the provincial audit office’s discretion
in whether to conduct audits in particular areas. We find that the overall hometown-expenditure
relation is driven entirely by the per audit rate of suspicious expenditures (column (7)) rather than
the number of audits (column (8)). While ex ante we have no strong prior expectations of whether
hometown ties affect thenumber or intensity of audits, the fact that we find evidence only for the
latter is most plausibly the result of fixed government rules dictating the audits that take place in
8In this exercise, our aim is to assess whether the 2013 anti-corruption campaign acts as a confounder for the
relationship between hometown auditors and suspicious expenditures, rather than speculating about whether this
relationship should change as a result of the crackdown. We note that corruption – while possibly related to hometown
ties – is a distinct phenomenon, so that a decline in corruption does not necessarily affect hometown favoritism. The
lack of any change in the homeotwn audit effect after 2013 has many candidate explanations: it may reflect that the
campaign was politically-driven, as many have speculated, or that its priorities lay in domains other than auditing.
For the purposes of our paper, the main takeaway is that the hometown effect is statistically indistinguishable in the
pre- versus post-2013 periods.
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each city, which may limit auditor discretion on this margin.
There are two primary explanations for the low rate of suspicious expenditures uncovered in
chief auditors’ hometowns, which have very different implications for the role of hometown ties.
The two accounts build on the classic tradeoff implicated by social connections more broadly –
favoritism versus reduced information frictions, each of which may result from stronger social ties.
Under the alternative information frictions interpretation (which we refer to as the “deterrence”
interpretation), hometown auditors may have the insider knowledge and/or networks that facilitate
more rigorous enforcement. Anticipating more stringent oversight, city officials may engage in less
suspicious activity.
One natural approach to testing for the deterrence interpretation is to consider whether the
hometown auditor effect varies across his tenure. As we discuss in Section 2.1, there are many
candidates for the provincial chief auditor position, and also uncertainty over the timing of an
incumbent auditor’s departure. As a result, it would be very difficult for city officials to forecast
the timing of the incumbent’s departure or the identity of his successor. Hence, first-year audi-
tors conduct audits of prefecture officials who likely did not anticipate the chief auditor’s changed
hometown status.
In Table 4 we provide three specifications that assess the extent to which the deterrence story is
likely to play a first-order role. In column (1) we add the interaction term FirstY ear ∗Hometown
(as well as the direct effect, FirstY ear) to capture whether there is a differential effect of hometown
auditors in their first year in the position. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, though
small in magnitude. It is relatively imprecisely measured, but still implies that one may reject that
the coefficients on FirstY ear ∗ Hometown and Hometown sum to zero (i.e., that the hometown
effect when FirstY ear = 1 is equal to zero) at the 1 percent level. In column (2), instead of
focusing only on the first year, we allow the hometown effect to vary linearly as a function of the chief
auditor’s tenure (Tenure∗Hometown), and in column (3) we also introduce a quadratic interaction
(Tenure2 ∗Hometown). In neither of these cases is there any evidence that the hometown effect is
stronger in the earlier years of an auditor’s tenure.
We may exploit a second dimension of heterogeneity both to assess the plausibility of the de-
terrence view, as well as to further bolster the view that the auditor’s hometown ties – rather than
some other correlated attribute – accounts for our main results. Specifically, we take advantage
of the differential timing of turnover for prefectures’ chief officers which, as noted in Section 2.1,
automatically triggers an audit jointly overseen by the provincial chief auditor and the provincial
Organization Department. We argue that the additional layer of oversight provided by the Orga-
nization Department – the province’s most powerful administrative body – limits the provincial
auditor’s scope for leniency, while not limiting his ability to use inside knowledge to evaluate pre-
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fecture expenditures. Thus, if leniency accounts for the our main hometown effect, we expect it
will be reduced in turnover years; we do not expect this to be the case if deterrenceis behind the
lower rate of suspicious expenditures. We define the indicator variable CityTurnovercy to denote
any year y that the mayor or party secretary of prefecture c leaves his position. This is a relatively
infrequent occurrence – there is turnover in 541 (20.5 percent) of our observations, in part because
it is fairly common for both chief executives to be replaced simultaneously (and they generally do
so on a five year cycle).
In column (1) of Table 5 we provide estimates of Equation (1), adding CityTurnover and
CityTurnover∗Hometown as covariates. The direct effect of CityTurnover is quantitatively small,
and statistically insignificant. Of greater interest, the coefficient on CityTurnover ∗ Hometown
(0.25) is nearly half the size of the coefficient on Hometown, but of opposite sign, and significant at
the 5 percent level. Thus, turnover-induced audits overseen by the Organization Department turn
up relatively more suspicious expenditures when targeting the hometown of the province’s chief
auditor. Paralleling our presentation of results in Table 3, we show the decomposition of this effect
into suspicious expenditures per audit versus number of audits. As before, we find that the effect
comes entirely from the expenditures-per-audit margin.
Taking stock of the results presented thus far, we argue that they strongly suggest that chief
auditors show greater leniency when assessing their hometown governments.
Firm-level results on SOE earnings manipulation
We next present a set of analyses at the firm-level of locally-owned state-owned enterprises; these
results complement our city-level findings in two ways. First, they allow us to assess the association
between hometown auditors and audit outcomes for a distinct set of organizations – it may give
greater confidence in our interpretation if we find consistent results across the two sets of analyses.
Second, we may build on the vast literature in accounting on earnings manipulation to relate the
presence of a hometown auditor to suspicious behaviors of audited entities, rather than findings of
suspicious behaviors uncovered by the auditor. The latter case, which is what we measure in our
city-level analyses, conflates suspicious actions with the auditor’s ability or willingness to uncover
suspicious actions.
As outlined in Section 2.3, we measure earnings management by SOEs primarily based on Real
Activity Manipulation (RAM). Recall that this measure aims to capture three types of manipulation:
cash flow via cash discounts to generate short-term sales, overproduction to generate higher margins,
and the postponement of discretionary expenditures (e.g., R&D) to boost short-term earnings.
Our main specification is similar to Equation 1, except that the level of observation is at the
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firm-year (fy):
RAMfy = βHometowna(c(f))y + βaXa(c(f))y + βcXc(f)y + + βcXfy+ ωf + υy + εfy (2)
As implied by the specification in (2), we maintain our full set of time-varying auditor and city
controls, and add in a set of firm-level control variables. In our preferred specification, we include
firm fixed effects (ωf ), which absorb the city fixed effects we employed in the preceding analyses.
Standard errors are clustered at the city level, to account for the level of identifying variation.
We present results based on equation 2 in Table 6. In column (1) we show results including only
year and firm fixed effects as controls, so that we may identify the hometown-RAM relationship
from auditor turnover. We observe a positive relationship, with a coefficient of 0.029 on Hometown.
We add progressively more controls in the next set of columns, including auditor characteristics
(column (2)), firm characteristics (column (3)), and city characteristics (column (4)). The addition
of auditor controls leads to a coefficient on Hometown of 0.038 (significant at the 5 percent level),
so that the presence of a hometown auditor is associated with an increase of more than 30 percent
of the within-firm standard deviation in RAM of 0.118 (assuming that real activities do not change
with the presence of a hometown auditor for reasons other than earnings manipulation). The further
addition of firm and city controls has little effect on the estimated relationship. In Appendix Table
A1, we use accruals manipulation (Dechow et al. (1995)) as the outcome. While we observe a
positive correlation between the presence of a hometown auditor and earnings manipulation, the
correlation is quite weak.9
Finally, in Appendix Tables A2 and A3 we repeat our analyses of RAM for two sets of firms
not overseen by the provincial auditor: centrally-owned SOEs, which are audited by the central
government, and non-SOE firms. We may view these as placebo tests for the association between
hometown auditors and earnings manipulation. In both cases, the coefficients on Hometown are
uniformly small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we show robust statistical evidence that provincial chief auditors turn up fewer sus-
picious expenditures in audits of government activities in their hometowns. Consistent with these
results reflecting leniency toward hometown governments, this effect is reduced in years that audits
9As suggested by Cohen et al. (2008), accruals versus real activity manipulation may be substitutes. If so, one
may not necessarily expect both measures to be positively correlated with opportunities for manipulation.
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are overseen by the province Organization Department, which limits the provincial chief auditor’s
discretion. We find supporting evidence in our analyses of earnings manipulation by locally-owned
SOEs, also overseen by the provincial chief auditor.
To our knowledge, we are the first to document the consequences of shared backgrounds on the
quality of government audits. Our findings have implications for the optimal design of government
monitoring institutions – we highlight the importance of accounting for a wider range of potential
conflicts-of-interest in the assignment of monitors – and also for researchers in political economy,
in modeling the role of social ties in bureaucracies.
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics, City-Year Aggregates
Variable Name Mean StdDev Obs
log(SuspiciousExpenditures) 11.471 1.824 2640
log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) 5.560 1.753 2640
log(Projects Audited) 5.913 0.686 2640
Hometown 0.121 0.326 2640
Gender 0.878 0.327 2640
Age 54.466 3.194 2640
Tenure 4.663 2.759 2640
Tenure2 29.351 30.285 2640
Education 2.375 0.783 2640
EduFinance 0.373 0.484 2640
PastAuditor 0.408 0.491 2640
PastF inance 0.168 0.374 2640
PastDiscipline 0.083 0.276 2640
PastCityLeader 0.248 0.432 2640
Log(GDP ) 10.230 0.758 2640
IndustrialRatio 0.498 0.099 2640
Log(GovRev) 13.363 1.082 2640
GovBalance 2.591 1.448 2640
FDI/GDP 0.020 0.019 2640
AvgEdu 8.608 0.611 2640
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Table 1b: Summary Statistics, Firm-Year Aggregates for Locally-Owned SOEs
Variable Name Mean StdDev Obs
RAM 0.010 0.188 5503
AM -0.005 0.111 5236
log(Assets) 22.210 1.213 5503
Leverage 0.531 0.204 5503
ROA 0.027 0.059 5503
MBRatio 3.225 3.112 5503
TopOwnership 0.373 0.153 5503
log(BoardSize) 2.316 0.178 5503
Dual 0.115 0.319 5503
Ind_Dir_Ratio 0.365 0.050 5503
Mgtshare 0.003 0.014 5503
Big4Audit 0.044 0.204 5503
Notes: log(SuspiciousExpenditures) is the logarithm of total questionable expenditures
found during the audit. log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) is the logarithm of total
questionable expenditures per audited project. log(Projects Audited) is the logarithm
of number of audited projects. Hometown is an indicator variable denoting that the
provincial chief auditor was born in city c. Gender is an indicator variable denoting that
the chief auditor is male. Age is the age of the chief auditor. Tenure is the tenure of
the chief auditor. Education is the education of the chief auditor: 4 for doctor, 3 for
master, 2 for bachelor, 1 for college or lower level. EduFinance is an indicator variable
denoting whether the chief auditor has a business nance background. PastAuditor
is an indicator variable denoting whether the chief auditor previously worked in the
auditing department. PastF inance is an indicator variable denoting if the chief auditor
previously worked in the nance/taxation department. PastDiscipline is an indicator
variable denoting if the chief auditor worked previously in the disciplining department.
PastCityLeader is an indicator variable denoting if the chief auditor worked previously
as a city ocial with rank vice-mayor or higher. Log(GDP ) is the logarithm of city GDP
per capita. IndustrialRatio is the ratio of industrial output to total GDP. Log(GovRev)
is the logarithm of scal revenue of the city. FDI/GDP is foreign direct investment
scaled by GDP. AvgEdu is the average number of years of education, at the province-
level. RAM is real activity manipulation. AM is accrual manipulation. Leverage is
total liabilities divided by total assets. log(Assets) is the logarithm of total assets. ROA
is return on assets. MBRatio is the ratio of market capitalization to book value of total
equity. TopOwnership is the ownership share of the largest shareholder. log(BoardSize)
is the log of the number of board members. Dual is an indicator variable denoting that
the chairperson is also the CEO. Indep_Ratio is the ratio of independent directors to
total number of directors. Mgtshare denotes the fraction of shares held by management
at the level of vice-CEO and higher. Big4Audit is an indicator variable denoting whether
the rm's auditor is one of the Big 4 global audit rms.
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Table 2: Comparison of City Attributes, by Hometown Status
Hometown = 1 Hometown = 0 Dierence
Varible Name Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Dierence t-statistic
Log(GDP ) 10.217 0.641 10.232 0.773 -0.015 -0.330
IndustrialRatio 0.507 0.088 0.497 0.100 0.010 1.705
Log(GovRev) 13.388 0.962 13.360 1.098 0.029 0.442
GovBalance 2.652 1.192 2.583 1.480 0.069 0.798
FDI/GDP 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 -0.000 -0.232
AvgEdu 8.604 0.581 8.609 0.615 -0.004 -0.120
Notes: Hometown is an indicator variable denoting if the provincial chief auditor was
born a given city. See the notes to Table 1 for detailed denitions of the variables.
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Table 3: The Relationship Between Auditor Hometown and Government Audit Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable log(SuspiciousExpenditures) log(SuspExp/Audit) log(Projects Audited)
Hometown -0.319∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗ -0.391∗∗∗ -0.424∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.120) (0.111) (0.107) (0.106) (0.103) (0.118) (0.106) (0.049)
Hometown ∗ Post2013 0.125
(0.199)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City*Post2013 Controls Yes




Observations 2640 2640 2640 2640 768 2640 2640 2640
R-Squared .503 .795 .812 .813 .777 .824 .792 .808
Notes: Standard errors clustered by city in parentheses. The sample covers the period from 2006 to
2015. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(6) is log(SuspiciousExpenditures), which denotes the
logarithm of total questionable expenditures found during the audit. Column (6) includes all city and
auditor controls interacted with the dummy variable Post2013. The dependent variable in columns (7) is
log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit), which denotes the logarithm of total questionable expenditures
per audited project. The dependent variable in columns (8) is log(Projects Audited), which denotes the
logarithm of number of projects audited. The sample in column (5) is limited to cities that have variation
in Hometown during the sample period. Hometown is an indicator variable denoting that the provincial
chief auditor was born in city c. Auditor Controls include Gender, Age, Tenure, Tenure2, Education,
EduFinance, PastAuditor, PastF inance, PastDiscipline, and PastCityLeader. City controls include
Log(GDP ), IndustrialRatio, Log(GovRev), GovBalance, FDI/GDP , and AvgEdu. The coecients
and standard errors of the control variables are suppressed to conserve space. See the notes to Table 1 for
detailed denitions of the control variables.
Signicance: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 4: The Role of Auditor Tenure
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable log(SuspiciousExpenditures)




FirstY ear ∗Hometown 0.090
(0.112)
Tenure -0.008 -0.032 -0.028
(0.045) (0.033) (0.035)
Tenure ∗Hometown -0.004 -0.051
(0.027) (0.095)




Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
City FEs Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Controls Yes Yes Yes
City Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2640 2640 2640
R-Squared .813 .813 .813
Notes: Standard errors clustered by city in parentheses. The sample
covers the period from 2006 to 2015. The dependent variable
in all columns is log(SuspiciousExpenditures), which denotes the
logarithm of total questionable expenditures found during the audit.
Hometown is an indicator variable denoting that the provincial chief
auditor was born in city c. Auditor Controls include Gender,
Age, Tenure, Tenure2, Education, EduFinance, PastAuditor,
PastF inance, PastDiscipline, and PastCityLeader. City controls
include Log(GDP ), IndustrialRatio, Log(GovRev), GovBalance,
FDI/GDP , and AvgEdu. The coecients and standard errors of the
control variables are suppressed to conserve space. See the notes to
Table 1 for detailed denitions of the control variables.
Signicance: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%.
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Hometown -0.552∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗∗ -0.019
(0.112) (0.113) (0.053)
CityTurnover -0.028 -0.015 -0.009
(0.045) (0.046) (0.017)
CityTurnover ∗Hometown 0.249∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.009
(0.116) (0.120) (0.046)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
City FEs Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Controls Yes Yes Yes
City Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2640 2640 2640
R-Squared .813 .793 .808
Notes: Standard errors clustered by city in parentheses. The
sample covers the period from 2006 to 2015. The dependent
variable in columns (1) is log(SuspiciousExpenditures), which
denotes the logarithm of total questionable expenditures found
during the audit. The dependent variable in columns (2) is
log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit), which denotes the logarithm
of total questionable expenditures per audited project. The dependent
variable in columns (3) is log(Projects Audited), which denotes
the logarithm of number of projects audited. Hometown is an
indicator variable denoting that the provincial chief auditor was
born in city c. Turnover denotes years in which the prefecture
or mayor party secretary departs, which triggers audit oversight
by the province-level Organization Department. Auditor Controls
include Gender, Age, Tenure, Tenure2, Education, EduFinance,
PastAuditor, PastF inance, PastDiscipline, and PastCityLeader.
City controls include Log(GDP ), IndustrialRatio, Log(GovRev),
GovBalance, FDI/GDP , and AvgEdu. The coecients and standard
errors of the control variables are suppressed to conserve space. See the
notes to Table 1 for detailed denitions of the control variables.
Signicance: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%.
23
Table 6: Firm Level Regressions on Locally-Owned SOE Real Activity
Manipulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Real Activity Manipulation
Hometown 0.029∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
City Controls Yes
Observations 5452 5452 5452 4797
R-Squared .559 .562 .593 .604
Notes: Standard errors clustered by city in parentheses. The
sample covers the period from 2006 to 2015. The sample
includes all locally-controlled state-owned enterprises The dependent
variable in all columns is real activity manipulation (RAM).
Hometown is an indicator variable denoting that the provincial chief
auditor was born in city c. Auditor Controls include Gender,
Age, Tenure, Tenure2, Education, EduFinance, PastAuditor,
PastF inance, PastDiscipline, and PastCityLeader. Firm controls
include log(Assets), Leverage, ROA, MBRatio, TopOwnership,
log(BoardSize), Dual, Indep_Ratio, Mgtshare, and Big4Audit.
City controls include Log(GDP ), IndustrialRatio, Log(GovRev),
GovBalance, FDI/GDP , and AvgEdu. The coecients and standard
errors of the control variables are suppressed to conserve space. See the
notes to Table 1 for detailed denitions of the control variables, and the
text for further description of real activity manipulation.
Signicance: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%.
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Figure 1a: The Distribution of log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) across Years
Notes: This gure shows the distribution of
log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) across the years
in our sample. Each dot indicates the average of
log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit). The shaded area shows
the 95 percent condence interval.
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Figure 1b: The Distribution of Auditor Background across Years
Notes: This gure shows the distribution of auditor background across
years. Each dot indicates the fraction of auditors from dierent
backgrounds. The shaded area shows the 95 percent condence interval.
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Figure 1c: The Average of log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) across Years for
Dierent Auditor Backgrounds
Notes: This gure shows the distribution of
log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) across years, splitting
the sample based on whether the chief auditor was born
in the prefecture. Each dot indicates the average of the
log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) uncovered by auditors
from dierent backgrounds. The shaded area shows the 95 percent
condence interval.
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Figure 2: The Distribution of log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) across Dierent
Auditor Backgrounds, Before and After 2013
Notes: This gure shows the distribution of
log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) across hometown and
non-hometown auditors before and after 2013, the year the central
government initiated its anticorruption crackdown. Each bar indicates
the average of log(SuspiciousExpenditures per Audit) for the relevant
subgroup. The whiskers show the 95 percent condence interval.
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Table A1: Firm Level Regressions on Locally-Owned SOE Accrual
Manipulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable AccrualManipulation
Hometown 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.009
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
City Controls Yes
Observations 5344 5344 5344 4779
R-Squared .112 .114 .172 .178
Notes: Standard errors clustered by city in parentheses. The sample
covers the period from 2006 to 2015. The sample includes all
locally-controlled state-owned enterprises The dependent variable in all
columns is accrual manipulation (AM). Hometown is an indicator
variable denoting that the provincial chief auditor was born in city c.
Auditor Controls include Gender, Age, Tenure, Tenure2, Education,
EduFinance, PastAuditor, PastF inance, PastDiscipline, and
PastCityLeader. Firm controls include log(Assets), Leverage, ROA,
MBRatio, TopOwnership, log(BoardSize), Dual, Indep_Ratio,
Mgtshare, and Big4Audit. City controls include Log(GDP ),
IndustrialRatio, Log(GovRev), GovBalance, FDI/GDP , and
AvgEdu. The coecients and standard errors of the control variables
are suppressed to conserve space. See the notes to Table 1 for detailed
denitions of the control variables, and the text for further description
of real activity manipulation.
Signicance: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%.
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Table A2: Firm Level Regressions on Centrally-owned SOE Real
Activity Manipulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Real Activity Manipulation
Hometown -0.015 -0.003 0.005 -0.003
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
City Controls Yes
Observations 2145 2145 2145 1878
R-Squared .524 .529 .554 .576
Notes: Standard errors clustered by city in parentheses. The
sample covers the period from 2006 to 2015. The sample
includes all centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises The dependent
variable in all columns is real activity manipulation (RAM).
Hometown is an indicator variable denoting that the provincial chief
auditor was born in city c. Auditor Controls include Gender,
Age, Tenure, Tenure2, Education, EduFinance, PastAuditor,
PastF inance, PastDiscipline, and PastCityLeader. Firm controls
include log(Assets), Leverage, ROA, MBRatio, TopOwnership,
log(BoardSize), Dual, Indep_Ratio, Mgtshare, and Big4Audit.
City controls include Log(GDP ), IndustrialRatio, Log(GovRev),
GovBalance, FDI/GDP , and AvgEdu. The coecients and standard
errors of the control variables are suppressed to conserve space. See the
notes to Table 1 for detailed denitions of the control variables, and the
text for further description of real activity manipulation.
Signicance: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%.
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Table A3: Firm Level Regressions on non-SOE Real Activity
Manipulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Real Activity Manipulation
Hometown -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auditor Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
City Controls Yes
Observations 9200 9200 9200 7764
R-Squared .591 .593 .611 .617
Notes: Standard errors clustered by city in parentheses. The
sample covers the period from 2006 to 2015. The sample
includes all non-state-owned (fully private) enterprises The dependent
variable in all columns is real activity manipulation (RAM).
Hometown is an indicator variable denoting that the provincial chief
auditor was born in city c. Auditor Controls include Gender,
Age, Tenure, Tenure2, Education, EduFinance, PastAuditor,
PastF inance, PastDiscipline, and PastCityLeader. Firm controls
include log(Assets), Leverage, ROA, MBRatio, TopOwnership,
log(BoardSize), Dual, Indep_Ratio, Mgtshare, and Big4Audit.
City controls include Log(GDP ), IndustrialRatio, Log(GovRev),
GovBalance, FDI/GDP , and AvgEdu. The coecients and standard
errors of the control variables are suppressed to conserve space. See the
notes to Table 1 for detailed denitions of the control variables, and the
text for further description of real activity manipulation.
Signicance: * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%.
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